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ABSTRACT 
 
Managers sometimes manage earnings upward (i.e., engage in earnings management) or guide 
analyst forecasts downward (i.e., engage in expectation management) to meet or beat analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (MBE). Our results suggest that certain management behavior to achieve MBE 
is highly associated with firms’ level of accounting conservatism. In detail, we find that (1) the 
level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years, (2) 
engaging in earnings management to achieve MBE lowers firms’ level of conservatism, and (3) 
firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years (CMBE firms) whose credit rating had been elevated 
practice less conservative accounting implying that the MBE string itself might act as a substitute 
for conservative accounting in lowering firms’ cost of debt.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
anagers sometimes manage earnings upward or guide analyst forecasts downward to meet or beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (hereafter MBE). This is because managers consider analyst forecasts 
as an important performance threshold (Degeorge et al. 1999). Moreover, the market actually 
appreciates firms that achieve MBE with a premium (Bartov et al. 2002). Due to such importance of MBE, the 
number of MBE-achieving firms has increased in recent years (Brown 1997).  
 
However, there has been little research concerning the firms that consistently meet or beat earnings forecast 
for consecutive years (hereafter CMBE firms)
1
. While most of studies focuse on MBE firms, Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) first show that there is a positive relation between MBE consistency and firm value. Bartov et al. 
(2002) also find that firms with consecutive MBE have a greater premium in the stock market. Recently, Kross et al. 
(2009) provide evidence that firms with established MBE strings
2
 are more likely to guide analyst forecast 
downward by providing ‘bad news’ management forecasts, and the effect of this downward guidance diminishes as 
a firm’s MBE string increases. Nonetheless, none of these studies to our knowledge have yet established the link 
between CMBE firms and their accounting behavior.  
 
In this study, we focus on one of the most important practice in accounting, the ‘accounting conservatism’. 
This practice guidesfirms to recognize all probable losses as they incur, but defer any revenues until it becomes 
verifiable. Therefore, firms that practice high degree of accounting conservatism would reflect ‘bad news’ in their 
financial statement more timely compared to those that do not (Basu, 1997). In a similar vein, we suspect that firms 
that consistently release ‘good news’ around earnings announcement date to achieve MBE practice less conservative 
accounting.  
 
In this paper, by using firm-year measure of accounting conservatism, we test the relationship between the 
level of accounting conservatism and the MBE string as well as management behavior. Our evidence suggests that 
the level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years. Also, the model in this 
                                                 
1 This term is first used in Kross, Ro and Suk (2011). 
2 We use the term ‘MBE strings’ to depict firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years. 
M 
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paper shows that engaging in earnings management to achieve MBE causes firms’ level of conservatism to decrease. 
Finally, we find that CMBE firms with an elevated credit risk use less conservative accounting. This implies that the 
MBE string itself might act as a substitute for conservative accounting in lowering firms’ cost of debt. 
 
Firms that practice high degree of accounting conservatism tend to release verifiable and unbiased 
information to the public. Hence, the results presented in this study warn users of financial information to be more 
cautious when analyzing firms with lengthy MBE strings since their level of conservatism is likely to be lower than 
firms that d not achieve MBS strings. Therefore, while many investors and stockholders appreciate CMBE firms and 
interpret their MBE string as a sign of improved performance, researchers should consider the propensity of earnings 
management as well as the quality of earnings within CMBE firms.  
 
Our findings make the following contributions to the accounting literature. First, we provide a direct link 
between managers’ intent to achieve CMBE and accounting conservatism. Many researchers believe that the level of 
accounting conservatism adjusts to the demand from investors (Watts, 2003a). However, there is also evidence that 
firms intentionally manage their level of accounting conservatism to achieve managers’ specific objective (Jackson 
and Liu, 2010). This paper adds to the literature on the practice of accounting conservatism by showing that firms do 
manage their level of accounting conservatism strategically that is beyond reflecting the demand from investors. 
Second, we show that earnings management plays a larger role in affecting firms’ level of conservatism. Watts 
(2003a) argues that the accounting conservatism limits managers’ intent to manage earnings, but few have provided 
the link between two (Chen et al. 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Iyengar and Zampelli 2010; Jackson and Liu 
2010). By showing that earnings management among MBE firms affects the level of accounting conservatism, we 
provide an indirect relationship between earnings management and accounting conservatism.  
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, reviews of prior research on MBE firms and 
accounting conservatism are discussed followed by the hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data and presents empirical models to test the hypothesis introduced in section 2. Section 4 reports the results, and 
Section 5 concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Prior Studies On MBE Firms 
 
 The characteristics of MBE firms have been well documented throughout various studies. Degeorge et al. 
(1999) points out that the analyst earnings forecasts are important performance thresholds that managers try to achieve. 
In their article, they argue that managers boost their earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) 
finds that certain firm characteristics (such as higher transient institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit 
claims with their stakeholders, and higher value-relevance of earnings) are associated with incentives to meet or exceed 
expectations at the earnings announcement. She also examines the propensity for firm having positive abnormal 
accruals and concludes that earnings management plays a role in helping a firm avoid negative earnings surprise. 
Consistent with findings that earnings management plays a role in achieving MBE, Payne and Robb (2000) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) shows that there are anomalous discretionary accruals around an earnings announcement. 
However, earnings management is not the only way to achieve MBE. Evidence from other literature suggests that 
expectation management can also be used. Matsumoto (2002) examines whether managers guide analysts’ forecasts 
downward to achieve MBE and finds that downward guidance of forecasts dominates earnings management as a means 
to avoid negative surprise. Consistent with her argument, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) provide evidence of the 
upward management of reported earnings while guiding analysts’ forecast downward.  
 
Findings in these researches suggest that there are firms that intentionally try to achieve MBE, either through 
earnings management or expectation management. There are several explanations regarding motivations of these firms. 
The best way to find it is to observe market response of firms that meet or beat latest analysts’ forecasts. Bartov et al. 
(2002) find that there exists a premium for MBE firms compared to those who fail to meet these expectations. 
Interestingly, this premium exists even for firms that are likely to achieve MBE through earnings or expectation 
management. On the contrary, failure to achieve MBE engenders a large negative stock price response (Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002). Moreover, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that firms with an MBE string show a significant drop in 
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their stock price at the earnings announcement date if they break the string, while those who don’t have a string have no 
significant change in their stock price.  
 
Some studies on MBE have pointed out the importance of the MBE consistency. Bartov et al. (2002) find 
that MBE reflects a firm’s future performance and this predictive power is only slightly diminished if firms achieve 
MBE through expectation or earnings management. Also they report that the value premium for a habitual beater is 
greater than that of sporadic beaters. Consistent with their results, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) show that there is 
a positive relation between MBE consistency and the market value of the firm, which suggests that the market 
appreciates firms with a longer MBE string. Therefore, one can easily anticipate that firms that already established 
MBE string would make an effort to satisfy investors’ expectation. To report such earnings more often, firms need 
to exaggerate earnings by practicing less conservative accounting.   
 
H1: The level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years.  
 
2.2 The Relationship Between Accounting Conservatism And Earnings Management 
 
Conservative accounting firms usually understate net assets by recognizing losses in a timely manner than 
gains (Basu, 1997; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Accounting conservatism not only ensures the quality of earnings 
but also acts as a substitute in reducing information asymmetry. LaFond and Watts (2008) found that conservatism 
reduces the manager’s incentives to manipulate accounting numbers, hence reducing information asymmetry. 
Consistent with this argument, Hui et al. (2009) argue that, by reporting ‘bad news’ in a timely manner, 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry in the market as it acts as a substitute for a management forecast.  
 
Since accounting conservatism usually ensures that verifiable information is to be announced, prior studies 
argue that it limits managers’ ability to manipulate their earnings. Chen et al. (2007) show that the degree of 
earnings manipulation is lower in a conservative regime. They show that conservatism dampens managers’ incentive 
to manage earnings by increasing the current owner’s marginal cost to motivate the agent. Iyengar and Zampelli 
(2010) also support the hypothesis that conservatism limits earnings management opportunities since it improves the 
reliability of accounting performance. Overall, these studies suggest that there is negative association between 
conservatism and earnings management.  
 
Often times, unexpected accruals are presumed to be evidence of earnings management. Pae (2007) shows 
that approximately 63 percent of differential timeliness of the earnings are explained by the accrual component of 
earnings. In this accrual component, 93 percent of the differential timeliness of accruals is explained by unexpected 
accruals. Considering the common belief that the differential timeliness of earnings refers to conservatism, these 
results suggest that earnings management considerably impacts a firm’s level of conservatism. Similar to his study, 
Lara et al. (2009) find that firms with strong-governance and that show a higher level of conservatism tend to use 
discretionary accruals to inform investors about ‘bad news’ in a timely manner than ‘good news’. Results from both 
studies imply that firms that practice more conservative accounting are likely to use negative discretionary accruals 
to report bad news in a timely manner.   
 
Recently, Jackson and Liu (2010) show that firms with conservative allowance can use this account more 
strategically to avoid missing analysts’ earnings forecast. For these firms, it is observed that firms with pre-bad debt 
expense earnings that are slightly above analysts’ earnings forecast reduce their bad debt expense to achieve MBE. 
Moreover, firms with pre-bad debt expense earnings that are slightly below analysts’ earnings forecast even record 
income-increasing bad debt expense (i.e., negative bad debt expense) to avoid not meeting analysts’ forecasts. These 
types of income-increasing earnings management can be captured in positive discretionary accruals and attenuate 
the level of conservatism compared to the prior year.  
 
To sum up, results from these previous studies imply that firms that engage in earnings management to 
achieve MBE might practice less conservative accounting due to the recognition of income-increasing (positive) 
discretionary accruals.  
 
H2: Firms practice less conservative accounting as they engage in earnings management to achieve MBE.   
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2.3 The Relationship Between Accounting Conservatism And MBE String 
 
It is possible that firms try to sustain the MBE string in order to send an optimistic signal to market 
participants, or to extend firms’ investment opportunities. Ahmed et al. (2002) argue that borrowing firms, who 
require financing for a given investment opportunity set, reduce their cost of debt by accepting conservative 
accounting. On the other hand, even if a firm does not practice rigorous conservative accounting, if that firm has 
long enough MBE string record, it might appeal to investors as having healthy capital structure. As a result, it is 
highly likely that this type of firm possesses favorable long-term debt credit rating
3
. Therefore, if investors perceive 
MBE string as a substitute for the practice of accounting conservatism, managers would try to reflect as many ‘good 
news’ as possible in their financial statement to lengthen MBE string. This leads to the final hypothesis of the study. 
 
H3: Within firms that achieve consecutive MBE, the level of accounting conservatism would be lower for firms 
with high credit ratings.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample And Data 
 
Sample firms are collected from IBES, Compustat, and CRSP for the period of 1988~2009. We take analyst 
forecasts and actual earnings from IBES and daily price and bid-ask spread data from CRSP. All the other variables 
which can be seen from firms’ financial statements are obtained from Compustat. Long-term debt credit ratings, 
which are assigned by Standard and Poor’s (S&P), are also obtained from monthly updated Compustat data. 
 
From the intersection of IBES, Compustat, and CRSP data, we obtain 36,543 firm-year observations after 
eliminating the top and bottom 1% for size, market to book ratio (hereafter, M/B), leverage, return, earnings, and 
discretionary accruals. Among them, 15,204 firm-year observations achieved MBE. There are 5,574 individual firms 
which have an average of 10.81 years.  
 
3.2 Estimating The Level Of Accounting Conservatism 
 
Since there had not been a definite measure of accounting conservatism, many researchers had proposed 
various types of measures (Basu, 1997; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Zhang, 2000). Among them, the coefficient 
estimated from the Basu (1997) model is still widely used and supported by many researchers despite of some 
shortcomings (Ryan, 2006). Basu (1997) model cannot capture the firm-year level of conservatism, since it can only 
measure either the firm-level of conservatism, or the year-level of conservatism (which measures the level of 
conservatism for a specific year by assuming all firms are homogenous). This measure requires several years of 
observations to acquire firm-level conservatism. For example, to acquire firm-level conservatism by using the Basu 
(1997) model, we need an estimation period at least four or more years theoretically. Another measure of accounting 
conservatism proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) also requires 6-year estimation period. Later, Penman and Zhang 
(2002) construct a conservatism score based on inventory, R&D and advertising reserves. However, Hui et al. 
(2009) point out that their measure does not consider the overall level of conservatism in a firm’s accounting system. 
Sometimes M/B is used to measure firm-year conservatism. But Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) explain that using 
M/B as a conservatism measure might cause a ‘buffer problem’ (see, Roychwdhury and Watts, 2007 page 5).  
 
To meet the demand for a firm-year measure of conservatism, Khan and Watts (2009) introduced C_Score 
which captures both the cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of conservatism simultaneously. Unlike other 
measures, C_Score can reflect the timing of conservatism changes and the variation of conservatism across firms 
within an industry (Khan and Watts, 2009). It is thus a direct measure of firm-year conservatism. To obtain 
C_Score, annual cross-sectional regression must be run with following model: 
 
                                                                                        
 3Levi+ 4DiSizei+ 5DiMBi+ 6DiLevi+εi  (1) 
                                                 
3 Long-term debt credit ratings are usually assigned by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and used as a measure of firms’ cost of debt. 
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For firm i,    is earnings before extraordinary items,   is a dummy variable which equals 1 if   >0 or 0 
otherwise, where    is the return over one year
4
. Model also controls for size (     ), market to book ratio (    ), 
and leverage (    ). In equation (1), if we define G_Score (timeliness of ‘good news’ each year) and C_Score (the 
incremental timeliness of bad news each year) as follows, then equation (1) becomes the Basu (1997) Model.
5
 
 
G_                                      (2) 
 
                                        (3) 
 
After obtaining       from equation (1), each firm’s characteristics such as size, market to book ratio, and 
leverage are again used to derive C_Score as in equation (3)
6
.  
 
3.3 Estimation Of Discretionary Accruals 
 
We use modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals 
in this study.
7
 First, we estimate coefficients from following regression model by industry (Fama and French 1997) 
and year within same industry. 
 
        
 
           
   
         
           
   
      
           
             (4) 
 
For firm i at time t,      is total accruals of a firm deflated by its lagged asset. Total accruals are defined as 
earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operation.           is the change in revenues over a year, 
        is the change in accounts receivable over a year, and finally        is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment. Dechow et al. (1995) argue that the change in revenue should be adjusted for the change in receivable 
since it is easier for managers to manage earnings by exerting discretion on revenue recognition of credit sales. 
Therefore, after obtaining estimates, we use following regression model to calculate non-discretionary accruals. 
 
          
 
           
    
                 
           
    
      
           
         (5) 
 
Then discretionary accruals can be calculated by subtracting non-discretionary accruals from total accruals.  
 
                      (6) 
 
In this paper, we also construct ‘per share’ discretionary accruals (       )to compare with actual EPS 
obtained from IBES. Since       is already once deflated by            , we re-multiplied             and then 
deflated with         (common shares outstanding).  
 
                                       (7) 
 
After obtaining        , we calculate adjusted EPS as follows. 
 
       
   
                   (8) 
 
 
                                                 
4 Ri is the annual return which begins the fourth month after the fiscal year end. (Basu, 1997) 
5 The last line in equation (1) is an additional term compared to Basu (1997) Model. Khan and Watts (2009) include this additional term to 
control the ‘main effect’. In other words, this term is needed to control for the firm characteristics separately. 
6 Note that G_Score is a by-product of the equation (1). Since C_Score is a only variable of interest which proxies the level of accounting 
conservatism, we will no longer mention G_Score from this point on.  
7 Performance matched accruals model (Kothari et al., 2005) is also used. However, due to the similarity of results, we only report results from 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
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3.4 Extended Definitions Of Expectation Management And Earnings Management 
 
Kross et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms with established MBE strings are more likely guide analyst 
forecasts downward by providing ‘bad news’ management forecasts compared to firms with no MBE string. 
However, they also find that the effect of downward guidance via ‘bad news’ management forecast diminishes as a 
firm’s MBE string increases. That is, the magnitude of downward revision of analysts forecast through expectation 
management is smaller for firms with established MBE strings compared to firms with no MBE string. Although the 
attempt of expectation management encourages firms to achieve MBE, it is not considered to affect accounting 
conservatism. Therefore, within firms with MBE strings, it is important to clarify which management activity has 
been conducted in prior to achieve MBE. 
 
When collecting analyst forecasts and actual earnings data, we define f_earliest as the first analyst forecast 
which is announced three days after the prior year’s actual earnings announcement, and f_latest as the latest analyst 
forecast which is announced at least three days prior to the actual earnings announcement. To examine expectation 
management, we follow the definition described in Bartov et al. (2002). Thus, we classify firms having positive (or 
zero) forecast surprise with negative forecast error as expectation management firms. To examine earnings 
management, we classify firms with positive forecast surprise but having negative forecast surprise after eliminating 
discretionary accruals as earnings management firms.
8
    
 
However, there might be a case that a firm engages in both types of management (See figure 1 for more 
detail). Therefore, we categorize them into three types of management; 1) Expectation-management-only firms. 
These firms engage in expectation management but not in earnings management. 2) Earnings-management-only 
firms. These firms engage in earnings management but not in expectation management. 3) Mixed-management 
firms. These firms engaged in both types of management (expectation management and earnings management) 
simultaneously. In addition to these three types of management, we refer to firms engaged in either expectation or 
earnings management to achieve MBE as managed firms. Other firms that don’t belong any of above classification, 
however, still achieve MBE are referred as unmanaged firms.  
 
By the definition, unmanaged firms do not include expectation-management-only firms. However, it is 
possible that some firms with earnings management might be included in this category. Since the estimation of 
discretionary accruals is solely based on modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), we might fail to capture 
earnings management within firms that are already classified as unmanaged firms. Figure 1 depicts the three types 
of management described above. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In this paper, earnings management firms refer to firms who engage in earnings management to achieve MBE. Therefore, by definition, they are 
firms which have positive discretionary accruals. 
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Figure 1: Definition Of Management Type 
Definitions of Management Types Proposed in Bartov et al.(2002) 
Expectation Management Earnings Management 
  
 
Definitions of Extended Management Types 
Expectation-Management-Only Mixed Management Earnings-Management-Only 
   
In Figure 1, f_earliest is the first analyst forecast which is announced three days after the prior year’s actual earnings announcement. f_latest is the latest analyst forecast which is 
announced at least three days prior to the actual earnings announcement. Actual EPS is the EPS at the earnings announcement date. Adjusted_EPS is EPS before discretionary 
accruals. Forecast error can be defined as actual EPS minus f_earliest while forecast surprise can be defined as actual EPS minus f_latest. 
 
3.5 Tests of association between conservatism and the MBE string 
 
To test the relationship between conservatism and MBE strings, we use the following OLS regression models. However, the purpose of regression is 
not limited to find the association between two. Using this model, one can also find which types of management cause C_Score to increase or decrease.  
 
                                                                                                                         
  
    
  
    
     
  
    ε         (9) 
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In equation (9),           indicates the number of established MBE string for firm i at year t. Mgt_Type is 
a dummy variable which represents a firm’s type of management to achieve MBE. Thus, it is replaced by earnings-
management-only (Ern_Mgt_D), expectation-management-only (Exp_Mgt_D), or unmanaged (Un_Mgt_D) dummy 
variable when estimating. Ern_Mgt_D (Exp_Mgt_D) equals 1 if a firm achieve MBE through earnings-
management-only (expectation-management-only), otherwise equals 0. We define the variable in such way to 
separate the effect of earnings management (expectation management) from expectation management (earnings 
management). From above equation, we expect  
 
 to be negative, consistent with H1. We also expect  
 
 would be 
negative when Mgt_Type is Ern_Mgt_D, consistent with H2. However, we make no assumption on  
 
 when 
Mgt_Type is either Exp_Mgt_D or Un_Mgt_D. 
 
We include the investment cycle (Inv_Cyc), bid-ask spread (BASprd), return volatility (Vol), and return on 
asset (ROA) as control variables. Khan and Watts (2009) show that firm-specific uncertainty such as the investment 
cycle and return volatility are positively related to conservatism. And these relationships are well captured when 
using C_Score as a dependent variable from Panel regression. They argue that a long investment cycle increases the 
uncertainty of a firm since it increases the difficulty in estimating future cash flow which in turn might lead to larger 
losses. Thus, the agency problem arises and lenders, as well as stockholders, demand that those firms be more 
conservative. Note that Inv_Cyc is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle defined as the 
depreciation expense deflated by lagged assets. Therefore, the positive association between conservatism and the 
length of the investment cycle would result in a negative sign for the coefficient of Inv_Cyc when a regression 
model uses C_Score as dependent variable.  
 
LaFond and Watts (2008) show that level of accounting conservatism increases as information asymmetry 
increases. Since the practice of accounting conservatism reduces a manager’s incentives and ability to manipulate 
earnings, it reduces information asymmetry. Therefore, as information increases, the demand for conservatism 
increases to offset the information asymmetry that has already been generated. Again, Khan and Watts (2009) 
successfully demonstrate that there is a positive association between average bid-ask spread for a year (which is a 
proxy for information asymmetry) and C_Score.  
 
Many researchers such as Campbell and Hentschel (1992), and Christie (1982) find a negative relationship 
between return and return volatility. Since firms that practice more conservative accounting reflect ‘bad news’ much 
sooner than ‘good news’ in their earnings, Khan and Watts (2009) expect that return volatility would be much higher 
for conservative accounting firms around ‘bad news’1. And their results prove this relationship by showing a 
positive correlation between C_Scroe and return volatility.  
 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) find that a decrease in ROA is dominant when the overall level of accounting 
conservatism increases. Consistent with their arguments, Watts (2003b) finds that the negative ROA can be easily 
found among conservative firms. By showing mean ROAs in each C_Score deciles, Khan and Watts (2009) prove 
that C_Score also captures this negative relationship between ROA and accounting conservatism.  
 
It is also known that the market to book ratio (e.g., Watts, 2003a), size (e.g., Easley et al., 2002), and 
leverage (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) are directly related to firm’s level of accounting conservatism.2 
However, we exclude these variables in equation (9), since these variables are already considered in making 
C_Score. Not surprisingly, all coefficients become insignificant when including these variables. Finally, SIC 
(SIC_D) and year (Yr_D) dummy variables are also included to capture industry and year variation. 
 
In addition to equation (9), we also test the following model that includes all three types of managements 
to o the marginal effect of each management type when controlled for each other. 
 
                                                 
1 ‘Bad news’ implies low return of a firm. Therefore return volatility increases since there is a positive association between return and return 
volatility.  
2 See Khan and Watts (2009) pp. 134~135 for more details.  
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    ε      (10) 
 
 In above equation, we exclude mixed-management for two reasons. First, mixed-management involves the 
intersection of earnings-management and expectation-management. Thus, result can be insignificant if the effect 
from both management types on C_Score differ. For example, assume that earnings-management causes C_Score to 
decrease while expectation-management causes C_Score to increase. In this case, effects on C_Score from mixed-
management cases are unclear, since it offsets the effects of both management types. Another reason is to avoid the 
full-rank problem when adding the three different types of management in one regression model. Because all 
samples can be classified into one of four types of management (expectation-management-only, earnings-
management-only, mixed-management, or unmanaged), including mixed-management induces the full-rank 
problem.  
 
Because all cases are mutually exclusive, adding three dummy variables (as well as their interaction terms) 
into one regression model would not change the result. Hence, in equation (10), we expect signs of  
 
 and  
 
 to be 
negative.  
 
3.6 Alternative Model For Testing The Association Between Conservatism And MBE String 
 
The degree of earnings management in this paper denotes ‘the amount of discretionary accruals used to 
achieve MBE through earnings management’. Simply, the degree of earnings management is ‘per share’ 
discretionary accruals (DAPS) times the earnings management dummy variable (Ern_Mgt_D).  
 
                                     (11) 
 
Unlike earnings management, there is no way to examine the degree of expectation management. One can 
only check whether firms have achieved MBE via expectation management or not. Unmanaged firms, by definition, 
simply denote firms that achieve MBE without any type of management. In sum, earnings management is the only 
management type for which we can substitute the dummy variable into the variable (       ) which has an actual 
value. Therefore, we substitute           with         and rewrite equation (10) as follows. As in the equation 
(10), we expect signs of  
 
 and  
 
 to be also negative. 
 
                                                                                              
                                                                                                
  
    
      
  
               
  
    ε      (12) 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 1. We use CSRP to calculate the average bid-ask 
spread of a firm and Compustat and IBES to compute all other variables. Average C_Score is 0.0908 with standard 
deviation 0.0926. Both the average and standard deviations are slightly lower than those of Khan and Watts (2009)
3
. 
Exp_Mgt_D, Ern_Mgt_D, and Un_Mgt_D are dummy variables which indicate expectation-management-only, 
earnings-management-only, and unmanaged firms, respectively. Therefore, the mean values of these three variables 
represent the portion of firms that engage in each type of management to achieve MBE. Results show that the 
portion of earnings-management-only firms (0.0966) is greater than the portion of expectation-management-only 
firms (0.0692). Not surprisingly, the portion of unmanaged firms (0.3465) is the greatest among three, which 
indicates that many firms meet or beat earnings without engaging in any types of management activities. However, 
note that there is no guarantee that firms classified as Unmanaged do not engage in management activities due to the 
                                                 
3 In their paper, they report that average C_Score is 0.105 and standard deviations are 0.139 with 115,516 firm-years between 1963 and 2005.  
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misspecification of model. Ern_Mgt is a level of discretionary accruals needed to achieve MBE. Thus it only includes positive discretionary accruals among 
MBE firms. Table 1 shows there are an average of 0.1786 discretionary accruals used to achieve MBE.
1
   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics On Independent And Control Variables 
 
# of obs. Mean Stdev. 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
Dependent Variable 
 
C_Score 36543 0.0908 0.0926 -0.0648 -0.0278 0.0331 0.0963 0.1484 0.1941 0.2286 
Independent Variables 
 
MBE_str 36543 1.5704 2.1253 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 4.0000 6.0000 
 
Inv_Cyc 36543 0.0529 0.0335 0.0157 0.0214 0.0321 0.0460 0.0648 0.0907 0.1134 
 
BASprd 34229 0.0219 0.0250 0.0010 0.0015 0.0050 0.0144 0.0295 0.0506 0.0684 
 
Vol 36543 0.0328 0.0194 0.0128 0.0152 0.0206 0.0295 0.0407 0.0535 0.0629 
 
ROA 36543 0.0184 0.1537 -0.2298 -0.0972 0.0066 0.0449 0.0831 0.1252 0.1574 
 
Exp_Mgt_D 36543 0.0692 0.2539 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Ern_Mgt_D 36543 0.0966 0.2954 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Ern_Mgt 36543 0.1786 0.7051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4594 1.1375 
 
Un_Mgt_D 36543 0.3465 0.4759 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
DA 36543 0.0020 0.0800 -0.1356 -0.0908 -0.0362 0.0050 0.0430 0.0906 0.1300 
 
DAPS 36543 0.0948 1.8384 -2.1237 -1.3101 -0.4574 0.0553 0.6130 1.5438 2.4429 
Other Variables 
 
Ern 36543 0.0250 0.1165 -0.1904 -0.0962 0.0098 0.0506 0.0790 0.1128 0.1425 
 
Size 36543 6.0303 1.8165 3.2175 3.7332 4.6797 5.9370 7.2768 8.5213 9.2477 
 
M/B 36543 2.8024 2.6246 0.6827 0.8994 1.3386 2.0602 3.3443 5.4455 7.4853 
 
Lev 36543 0.4116 0.6578 0.0000 0.0000 0.0216 0.1757 0.5090 1.0767 1.6448 
 
Ret 36543 0.0748 0.5141 -0.5874 -0.4738 -0.2516 0.0021 0.2850 0.6623 1.0025 
 
Asset 36543 2124.2 6218.0 27.0 43.5 107.0 353.0 1357.9 4646.3 10095.0 
 
Sale 36543 1993.2 5883.7 17.7 36.1 107.7 374.7 1330.1 4453.5 9195.0 
 
Rec 36543 289.5 1134.5 1.5 4.0 13.8 47.7 176.5 572.2 1178.0 
 
PPE 36543 1504.3 5105.8 6.0 11.3 36.9 158.0 745.8 3060.6 7020.9 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for 36,543 firm-year observations. C_Score = Measure of accounting conservatism suggested by Khan and Watts(2010) MBE_str = Number of 
consecutive MBE string. Inv_Cyc = Decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle, defined as depreciation expense deflated by lagged assets. BASprd = Bid-Ask spread 
scaled by the price of the day. Bid-Ask spread for a firm year is the average of the daily spread for a year. Vol = Standard deviation of return for a year. ROA = Return on assets, 
defined as net income deflated by total assets. Ern_Mgt = degree of earnings management needed to achieve MBE, defined as DAPS times Ern_Mgt_D. Ern_Mgt_D = 1 if firms 
achieve MBE through earnings-management-only and 0 otherwise. Exp_Mgt_D = 1 if firms achieve MBE through expectation-management-only and 0 otherwise. Un_Mgt_D = 1 
if firms achieve MBE without any management activities and 0 otherwise. DA = Discretionary accruals obtained from modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). 
DAPS = ‘per share’ discretionary accruals, defined as DA times lagged assets scaled by common shares outstanding. Other variables are variables which are used to calculate 
C_Score or discretionary accruals. Ern = Net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. Size = Natural log of market value of equity. Lev = Long-
term debt plus short term debt deflated by market value of equity. Ret = Annual return which begins the fourth month after the fiscal year end. Asset = Total asset for a year. Sale = 
Total sales revenue for a year. Rec = Accounts receivable for a year. PPE = The gross value of property, plant and equipment. 
                                                 
1 Since Ern_Mgt=DAPS*Ern_Mgt_D and DAPS is ‘per share’ value, Ern_Mgt is also a ‘per share’ value. 
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Table 2 shows a correlation matrix with Pearson correlation at the top triangle and Spearman correlation 
at the bottom triangle. Most correlations are significant at the 1% level except two (C_Score & Inv_Cyc and ROA & 
Inv_Cyc). C_Score shows significantly negative correlations with MBE_str and Ern_Mgt which is consistent with 
our main prediction. And directions of other correlations such as C_Score & Inv_Cyc (spearman only), C_Score & 
BASprd, C_Score & Vol, C_Score & ROA are same as previous literatures.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (Pearson Top And Spearman Bottom) 
 C_Score MBE_str Inv_Cyc BASprd Vol ROA Ern_Mgt 
C_Score 1 -0.1898 0.0029 0.4100 0.3462 -0.2505 -0.0780 
  (<.0001) (0.5788) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
MBE_str -0.1908 1 -0.0438 -0.2329 -0.1030 0.1516 0.1382 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Inv_Cyc -0.0278 -0.0176 1 0.0557 0.0708 -0.0035 -0.0757 
 (<.0001) (0.0008)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4993) (<.0001) 
BASprd 0.4199 -0.2589 0.0861 1 0.4062 -0.1600 -0.0818 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Vol 0.4227 -0.0886 0.0489 0.4072 1 -0.3315 -0.0861 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROA -0.3703 0.2578 0.0223 -0.1981 -0.2524 1 0.0823 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Ern_Mgt -0.1222 0.3603 -0.0920 -0.1188 -0.0876 0.2234 1 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix among dependent and independent variables. In this table, the top triangle shows Pearson 
correlation while the bottom triangle shows Spearman correlation. Except two (which are shown in Bold type), most of 
correlations are significant with p-values which are less than 0.001. Variable descriptions are same as those in the Table 1. 
 
4.2 Average Level Of Accounting Conservatism Across MBE String 
 
Table 3, Panel A shows the average C_Score in response to the MBE string as well as the number of firms 
in each management type. The numbers in parentheses describe the portion of each management type compared to 
the total number of firms in each MBE string. Consistent with findings in Table 1, the portion of unmanaged firms is 
the largest among the four different types of management, and it occupies over 50% across the MBE string. The 
portion of expectation-management-only firms when MBE_str is 1 is 0.1362 while that of earnings-management-
only firms is 0.1248. Thus, we can argue that firms that achieve MBE for the first time after a break in the MBE 
string engage in expectation management slightly more than earnings management. However, this tendency of 
management is reversed after two consecutive MBE years. Within firms with more than two consecutive MBE 
years, the portion of earnings management firms is significantly larger than the portion of expectation management 
firms. In Panel B, we find that even after including the first year observations, on average, the portion of earnings-
management-only firms is 7% larger than the portion of expectation-management-only firms. This indicates the 
number of earnings-management-only firms is 1.59 times larger than the number of expectation-management-only 
firms. Panel B also shows the results from the two sample t-test. The t-statistic is 6.593 which is large enough to 
reject null. Therefore, one can argue that firms engage in earnings management more compared to expectation 
management when achieving MBE. Moreover, albeit weak, the portion of earnings-management-only firms 
increases up to 6 consecutive MBE years, while those of expectation-management-only firms remain steady. Most 
notably, second column in Panel A, Table 3 shows that C_Score decreases as MBE_str increases, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Figure 2 clearly depicts this relationship as we plot corresponding C_score for each 
MBE_str. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Khan and Watts (2009) pp.140 and 143. 
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Table 3: The Level Of Accounting Conservatism Across MBE String 
Panel A 
 Number of 
MBE_str C_Score Exp_Mgt-Only Ern_Mgt-Only Mixed-Management Unmanaged Total 
0 0.1067 N/A N/A N/A N/A 15204 
  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
1 0.0949 1094 1002 1049 4887 8032 
  (0.1362) (0.1248) (0.1306) (0.6084)  
2 0.0813 528 920 580 3089 5117 
  (0.1032) (0.1798) (0.1133) (0.6037)  
3 0.0720 326 584 314 1841 3065 
  (0.1064) (0.1905) (0.1024) (0.6007)  
4 0.0699 190 345 219 1045 1799 
  (0.1056) (0.1918) (0.1217) (0.5809)  
5 0.0605 124 238 155 605 1122 
  (0.1105) (0.2121) (0.1381) (0.5392)  
6 0.0581 86 160 108 399 753 
  (0.1142) (0.2125) (0.1434) (0.5299)  
7 0.0555 57 105 67 289 518 
  (0.1100) (0.2027) (0.1293) (0.5579)  
8 0.0410 39 70 47 181 337 
  (0.1157) (0.2077) (0.1395) (0.5371)  
9 0.0349 34 48 30 110 222 
  (0.1532) (0.2162) (0.1351) (0.4955)  
10<= 0.0249 52 59 47 216 374 
  (0.1390) (0.1578) (0.1257) (0.5775)  
Panel A reports the average C_Score across MBE string as well as number of observations for each type of management. Second column shows 
that average C_Score decreases as MBE_str increases. The number in parentheses represents the portion of each management type compared to 
the total number in the respective MBE string.  
Panel B 
Management Type # of obs. Mean portion Standard deviation 
Exp_Mgt-Only 10 0.1194 0.0171 
Ern_Mgt-Only 10 0.1896 0.0290 
H0: Mean portion of Exp_Mgt-Only    Mean portion of Ern_Mgt-Only 
t-statistic p-value 
6.593 <.0001 
Panel B reports the two sample t-test for mean portions of expectation-management-only and earnings-management-only firms 
reported in Panel A. Since the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level, we can accept an alternative hypothe sis 
which indicates that the mean portion of earnings-management-only firms is greater than the mean portion of expectation-
management-only firms. 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1797 The Clute Institute 
 
Figure 2 depicts changes of accounting conservatism level as MBE string increases using data in Table 2. 
Figure 2: The Level Of Accounting Conservatism Across MBE String 
 
4.3 Testing Hypothesis 1 And 2 
 
As we can observe in Figure 2, C_Score clearly decreases as the MBE string increases. Figure 2 itself is 
strong evidence which supports Hypothesis 1. In this section of the paper, however, we not only test the association 
between accounting conservatism and MBE string, but also test underlying mechanism which induces firms to be 
less conservative as the MBE string increases by using different regression models. Second to the fourth column of 
Table 4 show results from equation (9) for each management type.  
 
Table 4 shows regression results of equation (9), (10), and (12). Numbers in parenthesis represent the t-
value for each coefficient. MBE_str = Number of consecutive MBE string years. Exp_Mgt_D = 1 if firms achieve 
MBE through expectation-management-only and 0 otherwise. Ern_Mgt_D = 1 if firms achieve MBE through 
earnings-management-only and 0 otherwise. Un_Mgt_D = 1 if firms achieve MBE without any management 
activities and 0 otherwise. Ern_Mgt = degree of earnings management needed to achieve MBE, defined as DAPS 
times Ern_Mgt_D, where DAPS = ‘per share’ discretionary accruals which equals to DA times lagged asset scaled 
by common shares outstanding. Inv_Cyc = Decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle, defined as 
depreciation expense deflated by lagged assets. BASprd = Bid-Ask spread scaled by the price of the day. Bid-Ask 
spread for a firm year is the average of the daily spread for a year. Vol = Standard deviation of return for a year. 
ROA = Return on assets, defined as net income deflated by total assets. SIC_D and Yr_D are omitted in this table; * 
indicates p-value<0.1, ** indicates p-value<0.05, and *** indicates p-value<0.01. 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: C_Score 
 When Mgt_D in Equation (9) is 
Equation (10) Equation (12)  Exp_Mgt-Only Ern_Mgt-Only Un_Mgt 
Intercept 0.0810*** 0.0814*** 0.0805*** 0.0815*** 0.0812*** 
 (22.98) (23.06) (22.86) (22.77) (23.03) 
MBE_str -0.0059*** -0.0050*** -0.0047*** -0.0022*** -0.0044*** 
 (-28.86) (-23.48) (-22.37) (-6.61) (-16.50) 
Exp_Mgt_D 0.0030*   0.0020 0.0019 
 (1.73)   (1.14) (1.12) 
Exp_Mgt_D*MBE_str 0.0014***   -0.0022*** 0.0001 
 (2.67)   (-3.79) (-0.10) 
Ern_Mgt_D  -0.0015  -0.0022  
  (-0.88)  (-1.31)  
Ern_Mgt_D*MBE_str  -0.0017***  -0.0044***  
  (-3.5)  (-8.04)  
Un_Mgt_D   -0.0075*** -0.0076*** -0.0075*** 
   (-4.55) (-4.58) (-4.54) 
Un_Mgt_D*MBE_str   -0.00148*** -0.0040*** -0.0018*** 
   (-3.13) (-7.43) (-3.67) 
Ern_Mgt     -0.0019** 
     (-2.03) 
Ern_Mgt*MBE_str     -0.0007** 
     (-3.67) 
Inv_Cyc -0.0292** -0.0303** -0.0097 -0.0142 -0.0162 
 (-2.33) (-2.42) (-0.78) (-1.13) (-1.29) 
BASprd 1.6738*** 1.6726*** 1.6675*** 1.6605*** 1.6638*** 
 (82.88) (82.77) (82.60) (82.32) (82.41) 
Vol 0.4494*** 0.4500*** 0.4571*** 0.4610*** 0.4520*** 
 (18.42) (18.45) (18.75) (18.94) (18.54) 
ROA -0.0707*** -0.0712*** -0.0714*** -0.0688*** -0.0703*** 
 (-25.83) (-26.03) (-26.30) (-25.09) (-25.69) 
# of obs. 34229 34229 34229 34229 34229 
Adjusted R2 0.4153 0.4154 0.4167 0.4193 0.4175 
 
For each regression model, we include each management type dummy variable as well as its interaction 
term with the MBE string. In equation (9), the variables of interest are MBE_str, Mgt_D (Exp_Mgt_D, Ern_Mgt_D 
or Un_Mgt_D), and Mgt_D*MBE_str.  
 
Consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1, we find significantly negative coefficients on MBE_str for 
all management type cases. The coefficient on Ern_Mgt_D is insignificant (-0.0015 with t-statistic -0.88), but that of 
Ern_Mgt_D*MBE_str is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.0017 with t-statistic -3.5). This implies that 
firms that engage in earnings management to achieve MBE lowers their level of accounting conservatism and it 
comes into focus as MBE string increase, which is consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
 
In addition, we find that the coefficient of Exp_Mgt_D is positive and only marginally significant (0.0030 
with t-statistic 1.73). And Exp_Mgt_D*MBE_str is also positive and significant at the 1% level. (0.0014 with t-
statistic 2.67). Although we do not make any assumption on the impact of expectation management on accounting 
conservatism, results indicate that firms that engage in expectation management do not lower ones’ level of 
accounting conservatism.   
 
Surprisingly, the coefficients of Un_Mgt_D (-0.0075 with t-statistic -4.55 ) and that of 
Un_Mgt_D*MBE_str (-0.00148 with t-statistic -3.13) are negative and significant at the 1% level. Unmanaged 
firms, by definition, indicate firms that do not engage in either earnings management or expectation management 
when trying to achieve MBE. However, it is also possible that there are firms that actually engage in earnings 
management activity even if they are classified as Unmanaged firms, due to the misspecification of modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995). Another possible explanation is that it is an inherent nature of firms that achieve MBE 
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by ones’ own efforts (i.e., without any management activities) having low level of accounting conservatism as they 
often incorporate ‘good news’ in earnings report.  
 
 Fifth column in Table 4 shows estimates of equation (10). In this equation, we include all management 
dummy variables. Since all three cases are mutually exclusive, it is possible to estimate marginal effects of each 
management on accounting conservatism. Results indicate that the coefficient of MBE_str is negative and significant 
at the 1% level (-0.0022 with t-statistic -6.61) even after controlling for all management dummy variables. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of Exp_Mgt_D becomes insignificant (0.0020 with t-statistic 1.14) while 
Exp_Mgt_D*MBE_str is still negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.0022 with t-statistic -3.79). However, one 
can argue that the negative and significant coefficient of Exp_Mgt_D*MBE_str is driven by strong influence of 
MBE_str. The coefficient of Ern_Mgt_D is negative but insignificant (-0.0022 with t-statistic -1.31) in equation (10) 
while that of Ern_Mgt_D*MBE_str is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.0044 with t-statistic -8.04). 
Finally, coefficients of Un_Mgt_D and Un_Mgt_D*MBE_str are negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.0076 
with t-statistic -4.58 and -0.0040 with t-statistic -7.43 respectively). In sum, results in equation (10) reconfirm results 
in equation (9). 
 
 The best way to control management effects is to use variables with value instead of dummy. The degree of 
earnings management can be estimated by using equation (11). On the other hand, one cannot estimate the degree of 
expectation management by its nature. Therefore, we estimate equation (12) which uses Ern_Mgt instead of 
Ern_Mgt_D to further test hypothesis. Regression results from equation (12) are similar to previous results, but more 
aligned with Hypothesis 1 and 2 in this study. First, the coefficient of MBE_str is negative and significant at the 1% 
level (-0.0044 with t-statistic -16.50), which again support Hypothesis 1. Second, coefficients of Exp_Mgt_D and 
Exp_Mgt_D*MBE_str are insignificant (0.0019 with t-statistic 1.12 and 0.0001 with t-statistic -0.10 respectively), 
which implies that the degree of accounting conservatism is not affected by expectation management. Third, 
coefficients of Ern_Mgt and Ern_Mgt*MBE_str are negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.0019 with t-statistic 
-2.03 and -0.0007 with t-statistic -2.31), which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. This suggests that firms 
become less conservative as they engage in earnings management to achieve MBE, and the effect is accelerated as 
the MBE string increases. Finally, coefficients of Un_Mgt_D and Un_Mgt_D*MBE_str are negative and significant 
at the 1% level (-0.0075 with t-statistic -4.54 and -0.0018 with t-statistic -3.67 respectively), consistent with 
previous results. In addition, directions of the coefficients of the control variables are consistent with previous 
literature and significant at the 1% level.
14
  
 
 Overall, the results from Table 4 are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. Results suggest that the practice of 
accounting conservatism weakens as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years. In addition, using positive 
discretionary accruals to achieve MBE hinder firms from the use of conservative accounting. 
 
4.4 Testing Hypothesis 3 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, we first convert the S&P long-term debt credit rating into a numerical value
15
. We 
assign values in a way that firms with high credit ratings match with high scores. As a result, rating score 21 is assigned 
for firms with ‘AAA’ and 1 is assigned for firms with ‘D’ or ‘SD’. 
 
Among 36,543 firm-year samples, we first select firms whose MBE string are greater than or equal to 2. 
Then, we calculate the change of the rating score/C_Score by differencing the rating score/C_Score of the starting year 
(in which the MBE string starts) from the rating score/C_Score of the ending year (in which the MBE string ends). This 
procedure reduces the number of observations drastically due to their scarcity in S&P data. The final number of 
observations used in testing Hypothesis 3 is 947. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Except Inv_Cyc in some cases, all other control variables are significant at the 1% level. 
15 We assign numerical value on a scale from 1 to 21 in a way that higher values of rating are associated with better debt ratings and a lower cost 
of debt. This list can be found on the following WRDS website.  
(http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/documentation/comp/dataGuide/splticrm.cfm) 
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Table 5: Association Between The Level Of Accounting Conservatism And Credit Rating 
Panel A 
Number Of Obs. Direction 
Δrating Score  Δc_Score 
Mean T-Statistic Mean T-Statistic 
185 0< 1.5622*** 19.1072 -0.0114* -1.7223 
614 0= 0.0000 N/A 0.0096** 2.2512 
148 0> -1.6419*** -19.0261 0.0015 0.1662 
Panel B 
Number Of 
Obs. 
#Of Mbe 
String 
 
Direction 
Δrating Score Δc_Score 
Mean T-Statistic Mean T-Statistic 
82 
3≥ 
0< 1.3049*** 19.6204 -0.0047 -0.5050 
480 0= 0.0000 N/A 0.0126** 2.5112 
66 0> -1.4697*** -15.9467 -0.0013 -0.0976 
103 
3< 
0< 1.7670*** 13.1948 -0.0166* -1.8046 
134 0= 0.0000 N/A -0.0009 -0.1139 
82 0> -1.7805*** -13.1347 0.0037 0.3241 
 
Table 5 shows changes in level of accounting conservatism and its relationship with credit rating changes 
in CMBE firms. Among 36,543 firm-year samples, we select firms whose MBE string is greater than or equal to 2. 
And then, we calculate the change of the rating score (C_Score) by differencing the rating score (C_Score) of the 
starting year (in which the MBE string starts) from the rating score (C_Score) of the ending year (in which the MBE 
string ends); * indicates p-value<0.1, ** indicates p-value<0.05, and *** indicates p-value<0.01. 
 
Panel A, in Table 5, reports the corresponding results. The first row represents firms whose rating score had 
been elevated, whereas the second and third rows represent firms whose rating score shows no change or had fallen. 
The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3. The change in C_Score is negative and significant at the 10% level (-
0.0114 with t-statistic -1.722) within firms whose rating score had been elevated. This suggest that such CMBE firms 
use less conservative accounting, since the MBE string itself acts as a substitute for conservative accounting as it 
lowers the firm’s cost of debt. In addition, the number of observations whose change in rating score is positive is 25% 
greater than that of firms whose change in rating score is negative (185 vs 148). This implies that the market does 
appreciate firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years and credit where credit is due. 
 
In Panel B, we divide the samples into two subgroups according to each firm’s MBE string. The first three 
rows show results which are obtained from firms whose MBE string is less than or equal to 3. In this subgroup, the 
difference in C_Score is still negative but the p-value indicates that this change is insignificantly different from zero (-
0.0047 with t-statistic -0.5050). However, in the next subgroup, which is composed of firms whose MBE string is 
greater than 3, the change in C_Score is significantly negative (-0.0166 with t-statistic -1.8046). Therefore, Panel B 
results indicate that negative changes in C_Score in Panel A are mainly driven by firms whose MBE string is long 
enough. Overall, results in Table 5 generally support the idea described in Hypothesis 3.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Firms have a great incentive to meet or beat the latest analyst forecast. Since it is one of the important 
performance thresholds, managers are willing to engage in either expectation management or earnings management 
to achieve MBE. However, there has been little research concerning CMBE firms.  
 
In this paper, we focused on accounting conservatism of CMBE firms as well as their management behavior. 
Throughout the study, we find that (1) firms practice less accounting conservatism as MBE string increase, (2) using 
positive discretionary accruals to achieve MBE lowers firms’ level of conservatism, and (3) CMBE firms whose credit 
rating had been elevated, use less conservative accounting, which implies that the MBE string itself might act as a 
substitute for conservative accounting. 
 
In our findings, unmanaged firms are accounted for more than 50% of total MBE firms. And unmanaged 
firms in this study denote firms that achieve MBE without engaging in any management activities (i.e., these firms 
achieve MBE with their performance only). Therefore, the result seems to align with the common belief that most 
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firms achieve MBE with their own performance and only those who desperate engage in management activities to 
achieve MBE. However, it is notable that we also find the negative relationship between accounting conservatism 
and unmanaged firms. When adding unmanaged firms as a dummy variable in the regression model, we can easily 
find a negative coefficient. This result can be interpreted in three different ways. First, there are possible 
misclassifications due to the imperfection of a model. Because firms are classified based on various definitions and 
models, rather than the true management behavior, there might be firms that are classified as unmanaged firms even 
if they are, in fact, earnings management firms. Second, there might be other types of management that affect firms’ 
level of accounting conservatism, however, not captured in this study. Finally, we can carefully presume unmanaged 
firms are less conservative by nature since they tend to report ‘good news’ in a timely manner to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. 
 
Another limitation of the study is a lack of variety in measuring the level of accounting conservatism. If 
one can find the more appropriate measure, the unexplained negative relationship between unmanaged firms and 
accounting conservatism might be explained. Thus, future study should focus on explaining this negative 
relationship using various measure of accounting conservatism. By examining different types of management 
effects, we can better understand the role of accounting conservatism in CMBE firms.  
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